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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia jurisprudence has an evidentiary rule for scientific expert
testimony and a different rule for non-scientific expert testimony. In order to
understand the distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testi-
mony, a careful examination of the legal development of admitting expert testi-
mony in both the federal and West Virginia judicial systems is required.
This Article is divided into six parts. In Part H, a discussion is provided
concerning the pre-Frye' admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts. Part
1I looks at the development of Frye's general acceptance test in federal courts.
In part IV, an examination is made of expert testimony under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The Article then turns to West Virginia. In Part V, an analysis is
provided on expert testimony admission in West Virginia prior to 1980. Part VI
looks at the adoption of Frye in 1980 by West Virginia. Finally, in Part VII, a
discussion is provided regarding expert testimony admission under the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence.
II. PRE-FRYE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Most discussions concerning the evolution of the use of expert testi-
mony in federal trials begin with the 1923 decision in Frye v. United States.2
However, the issue of admitting expert testimony during a federal trial has a
long history that predates Frye.3 In a decision rendered by the United States
Supreme Court in 1884, the following general contour of expert and other wit-
ness testimony was given:
The general rule undoubtedly is that witnesses are restricted to
proof of facts within their personal knowledge, and may not ex-
press their opinion or judgment as to matters which the jury or
the court are required to determine, or which must constitute
elements in such determination. To this rule there is a
I Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 Id.
3 See Mark Lewis & Mark Kitrick, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: Blowout from the
Overinflation of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999)
("The history of federal court expert testimony is a fairly modem tale that began in the mid-
1800s."). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, 198 (1942) ("Precedents beginning in the four-
teenth century show the judges availing themselves of the aid of experts without formally call-
ing them as witnesses; from that time to this, expert testimony has been received in the common
law courts.").
[Vol. 104
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well-established exception in the case of witnesses having spe-
cial knowledge or skill in the business, art, or science, the prin-
ciples of which are involved in the issue to be tried.4
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1877 decision of Transporta-
tion Line v. Hope,5 held that "[i]t is upon subjects on which the jury are not as
well able to judge for themselves as is the witness that an expert as such is ex-
pected to testify."6 Hope illustrated that expert testimony
is often given upon subjects requiring medical knowledge and
science, but it is by no means limited to that class of cases. It is
competent upon the question of the value of land, or as to the
value of a particular breed of horses, or upon the value of the
professional services of a lawyer, or on the question of negli-
gence in moving a vessel, or on the necessity of a jettison.7
The rule regarding the decision as to whether to admit expert testimony
was noted in Spring Co. v. Edgar.8 Edgar held that
[w]hether a witness is shown to be qualified, or not, as an expert,
is a preliminary question, to be determined in the first place by
the court; and the rule is that, if the court admits the testimony,
then it is for the jury to decide whether any, and, if any, what,
weight is to be given to the testimony. 9
Prior to Frye, the central, though not exclusive, focus of trial courts when con-
fronted with the admissibility of proffered expert testimony was whether the
expert was "qualified."' 0 Other considerations involved the relevancy and help-
4 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, II1 U.S. 612, 618 (1884). See also Spring Co. v.
Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 657 (1878) ("Witnesses are not ordinarily allowed to give opinions as to
conclusions dependent upon facts not necessarily involved in the controversy; but an exception
to that rule is recognized in the case of experts, who are entitled to give their opinions as to
conclusions from facts within the range of their specialties, which are too recondite to be prop-
erly comprehended and weighed by ordinary reasoners.") (citing 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, LAW OF
EVIDENCE, § 440 (1877)).
5 95 U.S. 297 (1877).
6 Id. at 298. See also McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 694 (1890) (holding that Vir-
ginia's statutory "prohibition of expert testimony in establishing the genuineness of [bond]
coupons was. . . unconstitutional").
7 Hope, 95 U.S. at 298-99 (citations omitted).
8 99 U.S. 645 (1878).
9 Id. at 658. See also Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1881) (holding that the jury
cannot be instructed to accept expert testimony).
10 It should be noted that "[c]ourts at that time did not employ a generally agreed upon test
487
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fulness of the expert's testimony."
A. Qualified Expert Witnesses
The universal criterion for admissibility of expert testimony involved a
determination of whether an expert was qualified to testify on an issue before
the court.1 2 To satisfy this factor, trial courts evaluated the expert's success
within the marketplace of the occupation or profession with which the expert
was associated. There was a general consensus among courts that if an individ-
ual could make a living in his or her occupation or profession, then he or she
was qualified to testify before the court regarding issues falling within that oc-
cupation or profession. 3 In Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake,14 the court
stated that "[h]ow much knowledge a witness must possess before a party is
entitled to his opinion as an expert is a matter which, in the nature of things,
must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court."' 5
for admissibility, causing inconsistency and unpredictability in the admission of expert witness
testimony." Lewis & Kitrick, supra note 3, at 80.
11 For a general historical overview of the use of expert testimony see Learned Hand,
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40
(1901); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey
of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. Sd. & L. 131 (1995).
12 The Supreme Court ruled early in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170, 175
(1854), that testimony by experts may be admitted when their "occupations and experience
enabled them to express opinions ... upon which the court might rely with some confidence in
making up its judgment." See, e.g., Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1896) (witness
qualified to testify as expert); Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake, 144 U.S. 476, 484 (1892)
(witness not qualified as expert); Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 527
(1889) (witness not qualified to testify as expert); Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, 422-
23 (1888) (witnesses qualified to testify as experts); McGowan v. Am. Tan Bark Co., 121 U.S.
575, 609 (1887) (witness qualified to testify as expert); S. Pac. Co. v. Arnett, 111 F. 849, 856
(8th Cir. 1901) (witnesses qualified to testify as experts).
13 See David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1799, 1804 (1994) ("Expertise was
implied from the expert's success in an occupation or profession which embraced that knowl-
edge. If a person could make a living selling his knowledge in the marketplace, then presuma-
bly expertise existed .... In effect, the marketplace determined whether valid knowledge ex-
isted by endowing it with commercial value.").
14 144 U.S. 476 (1892).
15 Id. at 484. Accord Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U.S. 551, 559 (1891);
Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 353 (1890); Phelps, 130 U.S. at 527. See also Green
v. Terwilliger, 56 F. 384, 394 (9th Cir. 1892) ("The value of expert testimony depends, to a
certain extent, upon the general knowledge and experience of the witnesses; their competency,
character, and reputation.").
[Vol. 104
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B. Relevancy and Helpfulness
None of the pre-Frye federal cases addressing admissibility of expert
testimony provides much discussion concerning the need to establish the rele-
vancy and helpfulness of such testimony before its admission.t 6 However, it is
clear from the decisions that relevancy and helpfulness went into the admissibil-
ity equation. 17 As one court stated, "[t]he opinions of those who are learned or
experienced in questions of science, skill, or trade, which are not within the un-
derstanding of men in general, are admissible in evidence, when helpful to the
decision of the ultimate fact."' 8 In the case of Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co.
v. Tolson,19 the United States Supreme Court concluded that expert testimony
was inadmissible because it was not helpful to the jury. The Court reasoned as
follows:
[T]he question whether the place where the plaintiff stood on
the wharf was reasonably safe was one of the questions to be
determined by the jury, depending on common knowledge and
observation, and requiring no special training or experience to
decide, and upon which, therefore, no opinions of [expert] wit-
nesses were admissible.2 °
C. Criticism of Pre-Frye Approach to Admissibility of Expert Testimony
In a lucid article written in 1901, Judge Learned Hand was critical of the
16 The "relevancy" and "helpfulness" factors are still part of the admission of expert testi-
mony today. See FED. R. EvID. 402, 701-02.
17 It was observed in Golden Reward Mining Co. v. Buxton Mining Co., 97 F. 413, 416 (8th
Cir. 1899), that "[i]f testimony is relevant to an issue, it is generally admissible." See also
Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. United States, 211 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1908) (expert testi-
mony not relevant); Tolson, 139 U.S. at 560 (expert witness opinion was not relevant or helpful
to the jury); Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1876) (expert
testimony not helpful); Kohn v. Eimer, 265 F. 900, 903 (2d Cir. 1920) (expert testimony not
necessary); Hardinge Conical Mill Co. v. Abbe Eng'g Co., 195 F. 936, 939 (2d Cir. 1912) (ex-
pert testimony not necessary); Shields v. Norton, 143 F. 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1906) (expert testi-
mony relevant); National Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1899) (finding
error in exclusion of expert testimony that would have been helpful to jury); Sugar Apparatus
Mfg. Co. v. Yaryan Mfg. Co., 43 F. 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1890) (expert testimony not helpful).
18 Gillespie v. Collier, 224 F. 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1915). Accord S. Pac. Co. v. Arnett, 111 F.
849, 856 (8th Cir. 1901) (expert testimony relevant and helpful); Mun. Signal Co. v. Nat'l Elec.
Mfg. Co., 97 F. 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1899) (expert testimony helpful); Waterman v. Shipman, 55
F. 982, 987 (2d Cir. 1893) (expert testimony helpful). See also Beale v. Spate, 74 F. 869, 872
(2d Cir. 1896) ("In causes involving complicated [technical issues] the presence of an expert is
always helpful and is often absolutely necessary.").
19 139 U.S. 551 (1891).
20 Id. at 560.
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use of expert testimony in federal courts and in courts in general.2' He noted in
his article that there were two "serious objections" to the admittance of expert
testimony.22 Judge Hand wrote that "first.. .the expert becomes a hired cham-
pion of one side," and "second ... [the expert] is the subject of examination and
cross-examination and contradiction by other experts. 2 3 The problem presented
by an expert becoming "a champion of one side" is the loss of objectivity in his
or her opinion. Additionally, permitting an expert's opinion to be contradicted
by other experts results in confusion for the jury in its search for the truth.24
Judge Hand's proposed solution to these vexing problems was to require courts,
rather than parties, to appoint an expert, "who shall advise the jury of the gen-
,,25
eral propositions applicable to the case which lie within his province.
Judge Hand's distaste for having the parties choose experts involved the
issue of expert credibility. That is, Judge Hand focused his attack on the jury's
inability to determine whether to believe the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
26
or the defendant's expert. From Judge Hand's perspective, allowing parties to
21 Hand, supra note 11, at 40.
22 Id. at 53.
23 Id.
24 See Ogden v. Parsons, 64 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1859) ("Where experts are introduced to
testify as to opinions on matters peculiar to their art or trade, there is usually some conflict in
their testimony."); Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858) ("Experience has
shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any
amount; and it often occurs that not only many days, but even weeks, are consumed in
cross-examinations, to test the skill or knowledge of such witnesses and the correctness of their
opinions, wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and perplexing,
instead of elucidating, the questions involved in the issue."); McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S.
402, 409 (1857) (Daniel, J., dissenting) ("To guide them in this, the only legitimate inquiry, this
court has had before them a species of evidence of all others best calculated to conduct them to
the truth--evidence superior to, and unaffected by, the interests or prejudices of partisans, or by
the opinions . . . of a class of men styled experts; men as often skillful and effective in produc-
ing obscurity and error, as in the elucidation of truth."); Green v. Terwilliger, 56 F. 384, 394
(9th Cir. 1892) ("The objection to professional expert testimony consists, to a great extent, in
the fact that in many cases the witness becomes an active partisan in favor of the party by
whom he is employed, and conducts his investigation in the character of an attorney, upon lines
most favorable to his side of the case, and when this position is taken the testimony is some-
times given in such a manner as is calculated to deceive and mislead, instead of to enlighten or
aid, the court or jury; and this occurs so frequently that courts have often condemned this char-
acter of testimony, and declared it to be entitled to but little weight, and that it should be re-
ceived with caution.").
25 Hand, supra note 11, at 56. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20
U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 489 (1986) ("Learned Hand wrote about [court appointed experts] in
1901, when he proposed a solution strikingly similar to modem Rule 706 which allows the
court to appoint its own expert witnesses.").
26 Judge Hand posed the issue as follows: "The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury,
not facts ... but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But how can the jury
judge between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to
their own?" Hand, supra note 11, at 54.
490 [Vol. 104
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choose experts transformed the judicial process into a contest for determining
which party could solicit the most believable "hired gun." While Judge Hand's
condemnation of the use of pre-Frye expert testimony may have had merits, the
more fundamental criticism, which Judge Hand did not address, involved deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony.
Understanding the admissibility problems posed by the pre-Frye stan-
dard requires an appreciation for what was occurring in America (and the world)
by the time of the 1923 Frye decision. The early 1900's bore witness to dra-
matic developments in science and technology spawned by the industrial revolu-
tion. Naturally, as a byproduct of such development, courtrooms began to fill
with litigation involving tremendously obscure and novel products and ideas.
The relative simplicity of everyday life prior to the 1900's was swiftly replaced
with scientific and technological advances. These advances placed a great strain
on the judicial system for fairly resolving disputes involving this new world
order.27 The principal reason for the strain on the judicial system involved the
"qualification" test for admitting expert testimony.
As previously explained, an expert's qualification to give an opinion at
trial depended largely upon the expert's success in the marketplace. This test,
however, was incompatible with the legal problems presented by the industrial
revolution. This incompatibility was succinctly observed by several commenta-
tors as follows:
But though it might be practical and easily administered, the
test of commercial value is a poor one. Its major weaknesses are
perhaps more obvious today than they were a century or two
ago. The market not only selects for validity, it selects also for
entertainment, desire, wishful thinking, hope, sometimes even
desperation. These are not without their value, but they are not
good proxies for what courts are looking for in expert testi-
mony. If the marketplace approves, as it does, of astrologers,
sellers of phony cancer cures, and guides to new age vortexes,
are those therefore good enough to provide guidance in a court-
room? The marketplace test is incapable of distinguishing as-
trophysics from astrology.
A second problem is that some fields have little or no life
in any commercial marketplace. Indeed, in the past century,
some fields have come into being that have no function outside
of their possible courtroom utility. The courtroom is their mar-
ketplace.
Finally, the marketplace test entirely conflates the expert
27 See Lewis & Kitrick, supra note 3, at 80. ("Throughout the early 1990s, the courts faced
an enormous influx of expert witness evidence, leading judges and commentators to believe a
more rigorous, systematic admissibility standard should be established.").
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and the expertise. Before the twentieth century, courts appar-
ently never considered the question of whether a body of as-
serted knowledge existed, and could be validated, separate from
the "qualified expert" who "possessed" it. The expert and the
knowledge were treated as one. If an expert were "qualified,"
then an expertise existed. But being a "qualified expert" pre-
supposes that an expertise exists in which one may have be-
come expert.28
III. FRYE'S GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TEST
The 1923 decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Frye v. United States29 supplanted the "marketplace" qualification test for
admitting expert testimony. The decision in Frye involved a criminal defendant
who was convicted of second degree murder. The sole issue presented on appeal
by the defendant was whether the trial court committed error in excluding expert
witness testimony regarding a deception or lie detector test performed on the
defendant. 30 The appellate court acknowledged that the issue of admitting testi-
mony regarding an opinion obtained from a lie detector test was one of first im-
28 Faigman, Porter, & Saks, supra note 13, at 1805 (footnotes omitted).
29 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30 The opinion described the test as follows:
The test is described as the systolic blood pressure deception test. It is as-
serted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the
witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by
nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous
system. Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear,
rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that
conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime,
accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination,
raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds exactly to
the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and attempted con-
trol of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points in respect of
which he is attempting to deceive the examiner.
In other words, the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and
comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires
a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus
produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise produced by
mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises
higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination pro-
ceeds, while in the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure
registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and gradually dimin-
ishes as the examination proceeds.
Id. at 1013-14. See also William M. Marston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception,
2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 117 (1917).
492 [Vol. 104
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pression. The court further recognized the novelty of the lie detector test itself.
The dispositive question for the court involved the reliability of this new scien-
tific technique. In rendering its decision that the new scientific technique was
not proven to be sufficiently reliable on which to base an expert opinion, the
court created the general acceptance test in the following brief passage:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.3'
The Frye concept of "general acceptance" ultimately became the principal test
for the admissibility of expert testimony by federal courts.32
The general acceptance test was dissimilar to the marketplace test in one
significant respect. Under the general acceptance test, expert testimony could
come from areas that did not have a commercial market as a litmus test for reli-
ability. In other words, Frye allowed "more knowledge to be assessed, even if
the knowledge [was] too new to be marketed commercially or if there [was] no
hope of ever marketing it commercially. 33 While the general acceptance test
opened up the potential to admit new types of expert testimony, it also served as
a tool to keep out "junk science" or novel scientific theories that had no proven
record of acceptance in the field it embraced.34
31 Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
32 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he general
acceptance standard set out in Frye was the dominant view within the federal courts at the time
the Federal Rules of Evidence were considered and adopted."). Although Frye became the
dominant standard to admitting expert testimony, it took a considerable amount of time for this
to occur. "After World War II, the case was only cited 6 times before 1950, 20 times during the
1950s, [and] 21 times during the 1960s ...." Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-
Brinks, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,
72 TEx L. REv. 715, 722 n.30 (1994). The Frye general acceptance test gained a firm foothold
after the 1960s. The decision was cited "100 times during the 1970s, 470 times during the
1980s, and 350 times in the early 1990s." Id.
33 Faigman, Porter, & Saks, supra note 13, at 1807.
34 The application of Frye was summarized by one federal appellate court as follows:
Under Frye, therefore, courts confronted with a proffer of novel scientific
evidence must make a preliminary determination through the introduction of
other evidence, including expert testimony, regarding (1) the status, in the
appropriate scientific community, of the scientific principle underlying the
proffered novel evidence; (2) the technique applying the scientific principle;
and (3) the application of the technique on the particular occasion or occa- 9
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Although the general acceptance test was praised by courts and com-
mentators,35 it also had its critics. The critics argued that the test was vague,
tended to exclude potentially useful evidence, did not guarantee reliability, and
was too general in its foCUS. 3 6 The Frye standard also received criticism for
causing undue delay in the admissibility of potentially reliable evidence and for
diverting attention from the issue of whether the expert applied the proper test-
ing procedure upon which his/her opinion was based.37
sions relevant to the proffered testimony.
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234.
35 It should be noted that the Frye test is still used today by many state courts as the basis
for admitting expert testimony. See S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 517
n.5 (Ala. 2000); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 125 (Ariz. 2000); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321, 324 (Cal. 1994); Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 (D.C. 1999); Flanagan v.
State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (I11. 1996); State
v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449, 464 (Kan. 1998); Anton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 607 N.W.2d
123, 127 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Syl. Pt. 1, Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000);
Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (Miss. 1998); Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1295
n.10 (Md. 1995); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997); People v. Wesley, 633
N.E.2d 451, 453-54 (N.Y. 1994); Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998);
State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996).
36 See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208-28 (1980).
37 The difficulties with the Frye test were summarized in Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236
(citations omitted), as follows:
First, the vague terms included in the standard have allowed courts to ma-
nipulate the parameters of the relevant "scientific community" and the level
of agreement needed for "general acceptance." Thus, some courts, when they
wish to admit evidence, are able to limit the impact of Frye by narrowing the
relevant scientific community to those experts who customarily employ the
technique at issue .... [O]ther problems that arise in applying the Frye test
[include]: the selectivity among courts in determining whether evidence de-
rives from "novel" principles; the inadequacy of expert testimony on many
scientific issues; an uncritical acceptance of prior judicial, rather than scien-
tific, opinion as a basis for finding "general acceptance"; and the narrow
scope of review by which some appellate courts review trial court rulings. All
of these problems contribute to the "essential vagueness" of the Frye test.
See also Alma Kelley McLeod, Is Frye Dying or Is Daubert Doomed? Determining the Stan-
dard of Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Alabama Courts, 51 ALA. L. REV. 883, 886
(2000) ("Some of the criticism surrounding the Frye standard stems from the difficulties in
identifying the appropriate field that constitutes the relevant scientific community. Criticism of
the Frye standard, however, goes beyond the mere difficulties in the application of a general
acceptance test. In fact, some commentators have criticized the general acceptance standard as
'not enlightening' and 'remarkably vague.' Furthermore, the general acceptance standard has
been attacked for both its exclusion of reliable evidence and its admission of unreliable evi-
dence.").
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IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A challenge to the Frye test surfaced in 1975 with the creation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.38 Specifically, the challenge came from Rule 702,
which, at that time, read as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.3 9
As literally formulated, Rule 702 did not reject or accept Frye's general accep-
tance test.4° In fact, the framers of Rule 702 did not even consider Frye when the
rule was adopted.4'
38 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
39 FED R. EVID. 702 (1999) (amended 2000). See infra note 82.
40 Commentators have noted the following distinctions between Rule 702 and the Frye test:
The conventional view that Frye sets a higher threshold for admissibility is
an erroneous one. Whether Frye or the Federal Rules constitute the more
rigorous test of admissibility depends on certain features of the proffered
knowledge. For example, Frye likely would be a trustworthy filter when the
asserted knowledge is relatively new and the field or fields that provide the
knowledge have traditions of vigorous research, testing, and debate. Scien-
tific issues that might be in this category would include the toxicity of sub-
stances, the psychology of memory, and the identification of chemicals. This
is not to say that the Federal Rules test would necessarily be less rigorous,
but the responsibility would be on the court to evaluate the validity of the
knowledge, and a considerable burden that is. It is no surprise that many
judges would prefer to rely on the expert's field to do it for them.
On the other hand, the Frye test is much weaker than the Federal
Rules test when the knowledge is provided by fields that lack traditions of
vigorous research, testing, and debate. Scientific issues that might be in this
category would include most psychological syndromes and most of the foren-
sic identification sciences.
Faigman, Porter, & Saks, supra note 13, at 1810. See also Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Com-
plex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355,
368-69 (1998) ("Many commentators and indeed many courts have assumed that Daubert set a
lower threshold of admissibility than Frye. In one respect this is true. A theory or technique
may not have reached general acceptance and yet would be admissible under Daubert. How-
ever, it is also true that general acceptance does not insure admissibility if a theory is untested,
and courts are less willing to allow experts to draw unsupportable inferences from existing
evidence. Rhetoric aside, courts, especially federal courts, are less willing to admit marginal
expert testimony than they were pre-Daubert. Within the area of toxic torts, where many cases
involve complex scientific evidence questions, the courts are much more likely to look behind
the assertions of an expert to the data and theories supporting those assertions.").
41 See Lewis & Kitrick, supra note 3, at 82 ("The text of Rule 702 did not address its 11
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As a result of the silence of Rule 702 on the continued viability of the
Frye test, a split of authority prevailed in the federal courts. A majority of fed-
eral courts incorporated Frye into Rule 702,42 while a minority of courts rejected
Frye.
43
A. Daubert Resolves the Conflict Between Frye and Rule 702
The United States Supreme Court found an opportunity to clarify the
role of Frye in relation to Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.44 Daubert involved a federal lawsuit brought by the plaintiffs, two minors,
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, and their respective parents, against the defen-
dant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 The plaintiffs alleged that Jason and
Eric were born with serious birth defects as a result of their mothers' ingestion
of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug marketed by the defendant. 46 The
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment that was supported primarily by
scientific evidence showing that Bendectin did not cause birth defects in hu-
mans.4 7 In reply, the plaintiffs filed affidavits of eight experts whose opinions
were based on animal and chemical studies that showed Bendectin did cause
birth defects in humans.48 The district court granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion on the basis that the plaintiffs' expert evidence was inadmissi-
ble because it did not satisfy Frye's general acceptance standard. 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.50 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to re-evaluate the standard of admissibility for scientific expert
witness testimony.51
predecessor Frye, nor did the rule make reference to the 'general acceptance' standard.").
42 See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) reh'g granted, 925 F.2d 1127
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989); Kropinski v. World
Plan Executive Council-US, 853 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Gillespie, 852
F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir.
1985); Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984).
43 See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794-97 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232-37 (3d Cir. 1985).
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45 Id. at 582. The case was initially filed in a California State court, but was subsequently
removed to a federal district court on diversity grounds. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 583.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 584.
51 Id. at 585.
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,52 held that Rule 702 super-
seded Frye.53 In rejecting Frye, the Court stated:
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general acceptance"
as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respon-
dent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a
whole were intended to incorporate a "general acceptance"
standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a
rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with
the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their general ap-
proach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.
Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a
specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general
acceptance," the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated
Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general acceptance" the ex-
clusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That aus-
tere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.54
In addition to rejecting Frye, Justice Blackmun, in Daubert, also set
forth guidelines on how to apply Rule 702. In so doing, Justice Blackmun ini-
tially stated the general rule for applying Rule 702 as follows:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset ... whether the expert is
proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.55
Justice Blackmun then proposed four general considerations to assist judges ingauging the reliability of expert witness testimony: (1) testing,56 (2) peer re-
52 Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Justice Stevens joined. The Chief Justice agreed with the majority that Rule 702 replaced
the Frye test. However, he dissented from the majority discussion on how to apply Rule 702.
See id. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53 The opinion noted that "[a]lthough the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on 'novel'
scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclu-
sively to unconventional evidence." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11.
54 Id. at 588-89 (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 592-93 (footnotes omitted).
56 Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or
497
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view, 57 (3) error rate/standards, 5 8 and (4) general acceptance. 59
Daubert became a problem for federal courts because Justice Blackmun
chose to address the issue of how Rule 702 was to be applied only in the context
of scientific evidence.6 ° In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be
whether it can be (and has been) tested. "Scientific methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsi-
fied; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry."
Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
57 Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one ele-
ment of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not nec-
essarily correlate with reliability, and in some instances well-grounded but
innovative theories will not have been published. Some propositions, more-
over, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published.
But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component
of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive
flaws in methodology will be detected. The fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispo-
sitive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular tech-
nique or methodology on which an opinion is premised."
Id. at 593-94 (citations omitted).
58 "Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should
consider the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation." Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
59 Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A "reli-
ability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identi-
fication of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of
a particular degree of acceptance within that community." Widespread ac-
ceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible,
and "a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support
within the community."
Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted).
It deserves noting that while Daubert rejected the Frye test as the exclusive basis for admitting
expert testimony, Daubert ultimately placed the "general acceptance" test back into the admis-
sibility equation-but only as a factor that courts "may" consider.
60 Federal courts have applied Daubert to a broad range of expert testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (machine detecting trace amounts of co-
caine); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994) (elec-
trophoresis, liquid chromatography, and growout testing); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d
1487 (8th Cir. 1994) (drug trafficking); Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 1994) (stan-
dard of medical care); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994) (identity and
amount of cocaine); United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (photogrammetry to
identify individual's height); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir.
1994) (opinion of radiation-induced cataracts); United States v. Jones, 24 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.
1994) (voice identification technique); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993)
(economics of cocaine trade); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993) (DNA);
United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 1993) (unreliability of eyewitness tes-
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that the majority opinion was wrong in providing "dicta" on the practical appli-
cation of Rule 702, because that issue was not before the Court.61 The Chief
Justice's warning found a basis in reality.
62
After Daubert, federal courts immediately encountered problems on
how to apply Rule 702.63 Some federal courts applied the Daubert framework to
timony); Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (ibuprofen-induced kidney
failure); Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993) (Bendectin-induced
birth defects); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993) (organized crime); Wilson
v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (effects of electroshock treatments); United
States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993) (money laundering scheme and techniques);
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 1993) (cause of fire); United States v. Bynum,
3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993) (chromatographic analysis of cocaine samples); Frymire-Brinati v.
KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993) (valuation of corporations' partnership inter-
est); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (future earning capac-
ity); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993) (cause of asbestosis); Cella v.
United States, 998 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1993) (cause of polymyositis); Petruzzi's IGA Supermar-
kets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) (economic testimony).
61 In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice argued that the majority opinion was creating
problems by going beyond the narrow issue of whether Frye was still applicable in federal
courts. The potential problems identified in the dissenting opinion eventually came to pass, as
federal courts were split on how to apply the principles set down by Justice Blackmun. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Does all of this dicta apply to an
expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowledge' - the other
types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies - or are the 'general observations' limited
only to 'scientific knowledge'? What is the difference between scientific knowledge and tech-
nical knowledge; does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase 'scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge' be broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise, or did its
authors simply pick general descriptive language covering the sort of expert testimony which
courts have customarily received? ... I think the Court would be far better advised in this case
to decide only the questions presented, and to leave the further development of this important
area of the law to future cases.").
62 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1779, 1782 (1995) ("The question of
[the] scope [of Daubert] was apparent even before the majority's ink was dry. Courts are asked
to consider the admissibility of testimony from such diverse professionals as laboratory techni-
cians, economists, nutritionists, mechanics, human factors analysts, pollsters, psychologists,
linguists, statisticians, and anthropologists. All of these proof offers are clearly subject to Rule
702, but as Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, [in] Daubert they failed to state whether they
should also be subject to the new reliability checklist.").
63 It has been noted in one commentary, "Canvassing federal court opinions citing Daubert
yields a hodgepodge of responses." M. Neil Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Hiers, The
Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 43 (1998). For a
general discussion see Shubha Ghosh, Federal and State Resolutions of the Problem of Daubert
and "Technical or Other Specialized Knowledge," 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 237 (1998); John
V. Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of
Reliability in Assessing Admissibility," 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (1998); Kristina L. Needham,
Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After Daubert: The Need for Increased
Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
541 (1998); Edson McClellan, Note, Sharpening the Focus on Daubert's Distinction Between
Scientific and Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1719 (1997).
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all expert testimony,64 while others applied the standard solely to scientific ex-
pert testimony.65 In addition, courts were confused as to whether to apply all of
the four factors set out in the opinion, or whether additional considerations
might be entertained.
B. Kumho Clarifies Daubert
The confusion encountered by federal courts in trying to determine
whether Daubert applied to all expert testimony, or simply to expert scientific
evidence, may be traced to a footnote in the opinion. In that footnote, Justice
Blackmun stated the following: "Rule 702 also applies to 'technical, or other
specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific context be-
cause that is the nature of the expertise offered here. 6 6 This footnote was later
clarified by the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.67
In Kumho, several plaintiffs sustained injuries when a tire blew out on
their vehicle.68 The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in a federal district court in Ala-
bama against the tire maker and its distributor.69 The complaint alleged that the
tire was defective. 70 The plaintiffs retained an expert who was prepared to testify
that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blowout. 71 The de-
fendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert and a
motion for summary judgment.72 The district court first held that plaintiffs' ex-
pert would be excluded because the expert did not satisfy the Daubert criteria.73
64 See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert applies to all
expert testimony); Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1997) (same);
Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Peitzmeier v.
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93
F.3d 362, 367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
65 See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (1th Cir. 1997) (Daubert
applies only to scientific testimony), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmi-
chael, 524 U.S. 936 (1998); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997)
(same); Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Compton v.
Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v.
County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
67 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that
an abuse of discretion standard applied to district court's decision to exclude scientific evi-
dence).
68 One person was killed in the accident. Id. at 142.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 142-43.
72 Id. at 145.
73 Id.
[Vol. 104
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss3/5
2002] ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN WEST VIRGINIA 501
The court then granted summary judgment.74 The Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed. 75 The appellate court held that the trial court committed
error in applying Daubert because the expert testimony was based on engineer-
ing technical knowledge, not scientific knowledge.76 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify the scope of Daubert.77
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,78 noted that Rule 702 made "no
relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other
specialized' knowledge .... Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies its
reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or 'other specialized' matters
within its scope.",79 In ultimately holding that Daubert applied to all expert tes-
timony, not just scientific expert testimony, the Court reasoned as follows:
80
[]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to ad-
minister evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation
depended upon a distinction between "scientific" knowledge
and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. There is no
clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such
as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific
theory itself may depend for its development upon observation
and properly engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to
distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines ca-
pable of application in particular cases.81
After resolving the scope of Daubert's application, Justice Breyer ad-
dressed the issue of whether the factors enumerated in Daubert could be ex-
panded or selectively used.82 The Court held that the Daubert factors could be
74 Id. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court entertained the
motion, but affirmed its earlier ruling. Id. at 145-46.
75 Id. at 146.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 146-47.
78 Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas
joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
79 Id. at 147.
80 Justice Breyer acknowledged the source of confusion regarding Daubert. He wrote: "We
concede that the Court in Daubert referred only to 'scientific' knowledge. But as the Court
there said, it referred to 'scientific' testimony 'because that was the nature of the expertise' at
issue." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999).
81 Id. at 148.
82 Rule 702 was amended on April 17, 2000 to reflect the rulings in Daubert and Kumho.
The current version of Rule 702 provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 17
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expanded and that not all of the factors had to be used if they had no application
to the expert's field.83
C. Federal Courts Now Have a Level Playing Field for Admitting Expert
Testimony
It is important to understand and appreciate the significance of the Dau-
bert/Kumho decisions. As a result of Daubert/Kumho, the "gatekeepers" in fed-
eral courts are not permitted to set up arbitrary and discriminating barriers for
expert witnesses.84 The decisions in Daubert/Kumho reflect the view that "[a]n
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testi-
mony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the princi-
ples and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 does not codify the Daubert factors, but references them in the
Committee Note. The Committee Note states that "[t]he standards set forth in the amendment
are broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the specific Daubert factors where
appropriate." The Committee Note also cites five additional factors that courts may consider in
rendering admissibility judgments on proffered expert testimony. The additional factors are the
following: (1) whether the research that forms the basis of the testimony was generated outside
of or within the litigation context; (2) whether the analytical gap between the methodology and
the conclusion is too great; (3) whether alternative theories have been appropriately ruled out;
(4) whether the expert shows appropriate professional care in testifying; and (5) the general
reliability of the field of research. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
83 Justice Breyer addressed the issue using these words:
Daubert makes clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a "defini-
tive checklist or test." And Daubert adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must
be "tied to the facts" of a particular "case." We agree with the Solicitor
General that "the factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent
in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." The conclusion, in
our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all
time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now
do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of
evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the par-
ticular case at issue.
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150 (citations omitted).
84 It must be noted that a majority of the states that have addressed the issue have adopted
the Kumho/Daubert test. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001); M.G. Bancorporation,
Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999); State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 (Haw. 2001); Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000); Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam
Corp., 755 So. 2d 226 (La. 2000); Theresa Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042 (Mass. 2000);
State v. Southern, 980 P.2d 3 (Mont. 1999); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862
(Neb. 2001); State v. Davis, 542 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 2001); Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2000); DiPetrillo v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677 (R.I. 1999); First W. Bank Wall
v. Olsen, 621 N.W.2d 611 (S.D. 2001); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.
1999); State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo.
1999). A minority of state courts have expressly rejected both Daubert and Kumho. See Loger-
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opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same degree of
scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a scien-
tist.'' 85 Under the simplicity and fairness of Daubert/Kumho, "the trial judge
must find that the expert has a sufficient basis for the opinion, that the expert is
using a reliable method, and that the method has been applied reliably to the
facts of the case. 8 6
In rendering a decision on any type of expert testimony, the Dau-
bert/Kumho analysis does not impose any stringent criteria outside of Rule 702.
Daubert/Kumho have appropriately provided trial judges with a list of a few
commonly relevant factors. It is most important to note that these factors are not
monolithic. The Daubert/Kumho considerations are factors that trial judges have
discretion to use when they are relevant to expert testimony. These factors can
be added to or simply not used when they have no relevancy in helping a trial
court determine the reliability of expert testimony. If Daubert/Kumho are
understood and applied with this understanding, one must conclude that
Daubert/Kumho did not drastically alter Rule 702. Those decisions merely pro-
vided potential working tools for the rule's application.
V. ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN WEST VIRGINIA PRIOR TO 1980
Prior to 1980, the admissibility of expert testimony in West Virginia87
was based upon whether the witness possessed skill, experience, or special
knowledge 88 regarding the subject of his/her opinion. 89 These factors were out-
quist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000); Bahura v. S.E.W. Investors, 754 A.2d 928 (D.C.
2000); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000); Long v. Missouri Delta Med. Ctr.,
33 S.W.3d 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
85 Xavier Pena, The Effective Evaluation of Expert Reliability, 20 REV. LTIG. 743, 753
(2001).
86 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Daniel J. Capra, Keeping the Reformist
Spirit Alive in Evidence Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (2001).
87 Trial judges had the authority to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Syl. Pt.
5, Overton v. Fields, 117 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 1960) ("Whether a witness is qualified to state an
opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on that point
will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused.").
Accord Syl. Pt. 5, Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974); Syl. Pt. 8, Moore, Kelly &
Reddish, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 165 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1968).
88 See Welch v. Ins. Co., 23 W. Va. 288, 305-06 (1883) ("Of facts, which require proof by
means of indirect evidence ... there are some of so peculiar a nature, that juries cannot without
other aid come to a direct conclusion on the subject. In such instances, where the inference
requires the judgment of persons of peculiar skill and knowledge on the particular subject, the
testimony of such as to their opinion and judgment upon the facts, is admissible evidence to
enable the jury to come to a correct conclusion. Thus the relation between a particular injury
inflicted on a man's body and the death of this man is an inference to be made by medical skill
and experience, and may be proved by one who possesses those qualifications."). See generally
State v. M. M., 256 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1979); Sisler v. Hawkins, 217 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va.
1975); Frazier v. Grace Hosp., 185 S.E. 415 (W. Va. 1936); Chapman v. J.W. Beltz & Sons
Co., 35 S.E. 1013 (W. Va. 1900); McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683 (1881); Beach v. 19
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lined in State v. Musgrave90 as follows:
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are
admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of in-
quiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove
capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason
that the subject-matter so far partakes of the nature of a science,
art, or trade as to require a previous habit of experience or study
in it in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When the question
involved does not lie within the range of common experience or
common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in the particu-
lar science, art, or trade to which the question relates are
admissible in evidence. 91
O'Riley, 14 W. Va. 55 (1878); Bryan v. Peabody Ins. Co., 8 W. Va. 605 (1875); Clay v. Robin-
son, 7 W. Va. 348 (1874).
89 See Syl. Pt. 5, Redman v. Cmty. Hotel Corp., 76 S.E.2d 759, 760 (W. Va. 1953) ("The
object of all questions to experts should be to obtain their opinion as to matters of skill or sci-
ence which are in controversy, and at the same time to exclude their opinions as to the effect of
the evidence in establishing controverted facts."); Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Brady, 140 S.E. 546, 547
(W. Va. 1927) ("A witness may testify as an expert, where he is qualified by practical experi-
ence in a field of activity conferring on him special knowledge, not shared by mankind in gen-
eral; the rule in this respect being that one who has been engaged for a reasonable time in a
particular profession will be assumed to have the ordinary knowledge common to persons so
engaged."); Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Musgrave, 28 S.E. 813, 814 (W. Va. 1897) (same); Syl. Pt. 1,
State v. Perry, 24 S.E. 634, 634-35 (W. Va. 1896) ("Whether criminal charges preferred by a
female patient against a physician are the result of hallucination, while under the influence of
chloroform and either, is a question that must be determined by expert medical evidence, as it is
not a matter of ordinary human experience or knowledge.").
90 28 S.E. 813 (W. Va. 1897). See also Syl. Pt. 5, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Christian, 99
S.E. 13, 13 (W. Va. 1919) ("Opinion evidence of competent experts may be properly called for
when the questions presented are of such a nature that persons generally would not be as com-
petent to pass judgment thereon as such experts."); McKelvey v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
14 S.E. 261, 262 (W. Va. 1891) ("The non-expert gives results of a process of reasoning famil-
iar to every-day life; the expert gives the results of a process of reasoning which can be mas-
tered only by special scientists.").
91 Musgrave, 28 S.E. at 819. See also Syl. Pt. 18, Lester v. Rose, 130 S.E.2d 80, 84 (W. Va.
1963) ("A witness who has certain knowledge and experience not possessed by the general
public in a particular field or subject is classified as an expert witness, and should be permitted
to give his opinion with regard to matters in question within his field upon the propounding of
proper hypothetical questions."); Sebrell v. Barrows, 14 S.E. 996, 998 (W. Va. 1892) ("For the
purpose of determining the competency of the witness, a preliminary examination takes place,
in which the witness may be asked to state his acquaintance with the subject-matter in reference
to which his opinion is desired, and what he has done to qualify himself as an expert in that
particular department of inquiry .... [I]t should always be required of an expert that he should
at least be sufficiently acquainted with the subject-matter of his testimony to know what its
laws are, and not merely to conjecture or to have an idea about it.").
(Vol. 104
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Under this standard, the trial record was required to clearly show that an
expert possessed the qualifications necessary to render an opinion.92 Addition-
ally, expert testimony without a basis of reliability had to be excluded.93 There
was also a requirement that expert testimony be relevant.94 Finally, expert testi-
mony was not to be given any greater weight by juries than non-expert testi-
mony.
95
The West Virginia Supreme Court also followed the rule that expert tes-
timony was not admissible on issues that did not require any special knowl-
edge.96 This point was stressed in syllabus point 5 of Overby v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Co.,9 7 where the Court stated that "[i]f the facts in a case can be
placed before a jury, and they are of such a nature that jurors generally are just
as competent to form opinions in reference to them and draw inferences from
them as witnesses, then the opinion of experts cannot be received in evidence as
to such facts."
98
92 See Syl. Pt. 2, Byrd v. Virginian Ry. Co., 13 S.E.2d 273, 273 (W. Va. 1941) ("The
qualification of an expert witness must affirmatively appear, but the ruling of the trial court
thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.").
93 See Syl. Pt. 2, Armstead v. Holbert, 122 S.E.2d 43, 44 (W. Va. 1961) ("Testimony of an
expert medical witness as to possible future difficulty in bearing children which is speculative
or conjectural is inadmissible and prejudicial.").
94 See Syl., Hazelrigs v. City of Huntington, 182 S.E. 877, 878 (W. Va. 1935) ("A hypo-
thetical question calling for an expression of opinion from an expert witness that is irrelevant to
the issues of fact being tried should not be permitted.").
95 See Syl. Pt. 2, Webb v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 144 S.E. 100, 100 (W. Va. 1928)
("The testimony of expert witnesses on an issue is not exclusive, and does not necessarily de-
stroy the force or credibility of other testimony. The jury has a right to weigh the testimony of
all witnesses, experts and otherwise; and the same rule applies as to the weight and credibility
of such testimony.").
96 See Syl. Pt. 2, Adkins v. Downing Gas Co., 198 S.E. 131, 131 (W. Va. 1938) ("In an
action or suit involving a title to lands, it is error to admit the opinion of a surveyor to the effect
that the boundary lines are either correct or incorrect. The location of boundary lines is not a
subject for expert testimony."); Syl. Pt. 2, Liberty Coal Co. v. Bassett, 150 S.E. 745, 745 (W.
Va. 1929) ("The judgment of expert witnesses on a subject which requires no special training,
in order to understand the evidence thereon, may be disregarded.").
97 16 S.E. 813 (W. Va. 1893).
98 Id. at 813. See Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Noe, 230 S.E.2d 826, 827 (W. Va. 1976) ("Although
the opinion of an expert is admissible if given within the field of his expertise, his opinion
regarding matters outside his field of expertise and within the knowledge of persons of common
experience and observation is not admissible."); Syl. Pt. 4, Overton v. Fields, 117 S.E.2d 598,
601 (W. Va. 1960) ("When the opinion of a witness, not an expert, is offered in evidence, and
he is no better qualified than the jurors to form an opinion with reference to the facts in evi-
dence and the deductions to be properly drawn from such facts, his opinion evidence is not
admissible."); Syl. Pt. 2, Thrasher v. Amere Gas Utils. Co., 75 S.E.2d 376, 379 (W. Va. 1953)
("Expert opinion evidence concerning a matter as to which the jury are as competent to form an
accurate opinion as the witness is inadmissible."); Syl. Pt. 7, Lawrence's Adm'r v. Hyde, 88
S.E. 45, 46 (W. Va. 1916) (same); Reall v. Deiriggi, 34 S.E.2d 253, 256 (W. Va. 1945) ("It is
only in situations where the jury cannot be fully informed regarding the facts upon which it is
21
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From a review of decisions by the West Virginia Supreme Court regard-
ing admissibility of expert testimony prior to 1980, it becomes abundantly clear
that ad hoc principles governed. 99 Trial judges and the West Virginia Supreme
Court approached expert testimony largely on a case-by-case basis, with no true
definitive principles for guidance. 1°° This situation existed because the courts
based that an opinion or conclusion becomes admissible."); State v. Hull, 32 S.E. 240, 243 (W.
Va. 1899) ("[W]hen the inquiry relates to a subject which does not require peculiar habits of
study in order to enable a man to understand it, the opinion of skilled witnesses is not admissi-
ble."); Welch v. Ins. Co., 23 W. Va. 288 (1883) (same); Hood v. Maxwell, 1 W. Va. 219 (1866)
("It was not a matter of professional or scientific skill and judgment as to which the opinion or
deduction of an expert is in some cases admitted as testimony, because of his supposed peculiar
or better means of judging, but simply a matter of fact which might have been proven as well
by any one who knew it. And if it had been a matter of skill and judgment, the witness was not
proven to have been an expert.").
99 See Byrd v. Virginian Ry. Co., 13 S.E.2d 273, 274 (W. Va. 1941) (A witness having
seven years experience as a fireman for railroad and occasionally operating trains thereon was
qualified as an expert to testify as to distance within which passenger train could be stopped.);
Syllabus, Foose v. Hawley Corp., 198 S.E. 138, 138 (W. Va. 1938) ("Respecting a physical
injury of which a person is suffering, a physician, grounding his testimony on direct informa-
tion or a proper hypothetical question, may give in evidence his opinion of the cause of which
the injury is the resultant."); Syl. Pt. 1, Sebrell v. Barrows, 14 S.E. 996, 996 (W. Va. 1892)
("Where a witness is called and examined as an expert as to whether a steamboat was properly
landed for the purpose of discharging a passenger, and as to what officers were required to
properly man such boat, it must not only appear that the witness has sufficient knowledge and
experience in reference to the subject-matter under consideration, but that he is acquainted with
the class and dimensions of the boat, and the character and condition of the river and shore
where the landing was made, or has heard the same described by witnesses in the case, before
he can be allowed to express his opinion as an expert."); Syl. Pt. 1, McKelvey v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 14 S.E. 261, 261 (W. Va. 1891) ("A locomotive engineer, without any experi-
ence or skill in the construction or repair of boilers, is not an expert as to the effect of broken
stay-bolts in the boiler, or of mud packed therein. His opinion is not admissible."); Syl. Pt. 4,
Bowen v. City of Huntington, 14 S.E. 217, 217 (W. Va. 1891) ("Where the conclusions called
for by a hypothetical question from a medical man, who is being examined as an expert, depend
upon facts, the evidential weight of which can only be determined by those familiar with that
specialty, then those conclusions may be given by an expert in such specialty.").
1oo See Syl. Pt. 1, State v. M. M., 256 S.E.2d 549, 550 (W. Va. 1979) ("Before a witness is
qualified as an expert on the subject of juvenile rehabilitation that witness must, through train-
ing, education or practical experience, possess significant skill and knowledge regarding the
rehabilitation of juveniles."); Syl. Pt 2, W. Va. Dep't of Highways v. Sickles, 242 S.E.2d 567,
569 (W. Va. 1978) ("In the cross-examination of an expert appraiser in a condemnation pro-
ceeding it is proper to inquire of the expert for the purpose of determining his methodology,
whether he evaluated particular sales in the vicinity of the subject property, and where he testi-
fies that he did not consider certain sales considered by the opposing party to be comparable, or
that he considered them but did not find them comparable, it is proper to inquire of him whether
knowledge of these sales would alter his opinion, or alternatively why he does not consider a
particular sale comparable."); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210, 213 (W. Va. 1976)
("In presenting testimony in a criminal trial, an expert medical witness should be permitted to
state the facts or data upon which he bases his opinion, and this includes information available
to him in the form of records or documents whose reliability has been reasonably established
and which have been kept in the regular course of professional care or treatment of the defen-
dant and are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the witness' particular field of ex-
pertise.").
[Vol. 104
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seemed to give greater attention to the identity of the expert than to the details of
the foundation of an expert's testimony. 10' This is to say that, prior to 1980,
West Virginia jurisprudence had no cutting-edge principle of law for focusing
on the reliability of an expert's evidence.
VI. WEST VIRGINIA'S ADOPTION OF FRYE IN 1980
Justice Thomas B. Miller altered the landscape for admitting expert tes-
timony in West Virginia with the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in State v.
Clawson.10 2 Clawson involved a defendant who was convicted of two first de-
gree murder charges. One of the issues the defendant assigned as error involved
the admission of expert testimony concerning hair samples allegedly belonging
to the victims. 0 3 Justice Miller observed that "[p]art of the problem lies in the
fact that the record does not adequately disclose the scientific basis for deter-
mining how comparison is made with regard to hair samples."' 4 It was further
noted in Clawson that "the trial court confronted with this problem should re-
quire some in camera disclosure of the test results and methodology in order to
make an initial determination of whether the expert's testimony should be ad-
mitted."
10 5
Clawson turned to the Frye standard for the admissibility of expert tes-
timony. Justice Miller reasoned that Frye allowed for closer scrutiny of the reli-
ability of "scientific" expert testimony. Accordingly, Clawson adopted the Frye
test in syllabus point 7 of the opinion as follows: "In order for a scientific test to
be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific princi-
101 See Syl. Pt. 4, Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 119 S.E.2d 401, 403 (W. Va. 1961) ("A wide
latitude as to expert medical testimony is allowed, and although it should be confined to the
injuries in question, such witnesses can give their opinion with regard to the nature of the in-
jury, whether it is permanent or temporary, and the probable result based on medical knowledge
and experience with regard to the injury or injuries."); Syl. Pt. 3, Nicholas v. Granite State Fire
Ins. Co., 24 S.E.2d 280, 282 (W. Va. 1943) ("Where an insured, in an action on a fire insurance
policy, seeks recovery under Code, 33-4-9, it is not prejudicial error for expert witnesses, called
for the purpose of establishing total loss, to testify as to what they would do with the property if
it belonged to them personally, where they testified further as to what a prudent owner of prop-
erty, having no insurance, would do with the property."); Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Johnson, 164 S.E.
31, 32 (W. Va. 1932) ("The question of the qualification of such [fingerprint] witness as an
expert rests largely in the discretion of the court, there being no arbitrary and fixed test of such
qualification. The weight of such testimony is a question for the jury."); Syl. Pt. 4, State v.
Friend, 130 S.E. 102, 102 (W. Va. 1925) ("A physician who has qualified as an expert, and who
has formed an opinion from a physical examination of the genital organs of a male, then af-
flicted with orchitis, regarding his ability or inability to copulate, may express that opinion in
his evidence to the jury.").
102 270 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1980).
103 Id. at 675. The case was ultimately reversed for a new trial on other grounds.
104 Id.
105 1d. at 678.
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pie which underlies the test."1°6 In addition to adopting the Frye test, Clawson
set out the following criteria in syllabus point 9 for determining the admissibility
of scientific test results:
The necessary foundation before the admission of the results of
any test are: (1) That the testing device or equipment was in
proper working order; (2) that the person giving and interpret-
ing the test was properly qualified; (3) that the test was properly
conducted; and (4) that there was compliance with any statutory
requirements.
10 7
The Supreme Court did not issue any other opinions regarding the
ClawsonFrye test prior to the adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.
VII. EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF EVIDENCE
On December 18, 1984, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence.10 8 Specifically, the Court adopted Rule 702
verbatim from its federal counterpart. West Virginia's Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
109
Although the admission of expert testimony was guided by Rule 702 af-
ter its adoption, the Court did not abandon its Clawson/Frye "general accep-
tance" test. That is, the West Virginia Supreme Court followed the line of fed-
eral cases that incorporated the general acceptance test into Rule 702.110
For example, in State v. Woodall,'11 Justice Richard Neeley set forth the
guidelines for using Rule 702 and Clawson/Frye.'12 In syllabus point 1 of Woo-
106 Id. at 662. In syllabus point 8 of Clawson, Justice Miller set out a qualification for using
Frye: "There are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time,
such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed." Id.
107 Id. at 663. See State v. Hood, 184 S.E.2d 334, 337 (W. Va. 1971) (setting out the same
criteria recognized in Clawson).
108 The rules were patterned after their federal counterpart.
109 W. Va. R. Evid. 702.
110 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
11 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
112 Prior to Woodall, the Supreme Court issued several opinions citing or discussing Rule
702 without referring to Clawson/Frye. See Morris v. Boppana, 387 S.E.2d 302 (W. Va. 1989);
Checker Leasing, Inc. v. Sorbello, 382 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1989); Riggle v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
[Vol. 104
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Woodall the Court stated:
Under W. Va. R. Evid., Rule 702, expert testimony concerning
generally recognized tests is presumptively admissible and the
burden of excluding such testimony is upon the side seeking ex-
clusion. However, when a test is novel or not generally ac-
cepted, that circumstance alone meets the threshold requirement
of rebutting any presumption of admissibility under Rule 702
and, therefore, with regard to tests that are not generally ac-
cepted the burden of proof that the test is reliable remains on the
proponent. 1
13
For any number of reasons, the Woodall formulation for admitting expert testi-
mony was not relied upon in subsequent cases decided by the West Virginia
Supreme Court"14
A. Wilt Adopts Daubert
Woodall created a standard for the admissibility of expert testimony that
Daubert determined was inconsistent with Federal Rule 702. In 1993, Justice
Miller, writing for the Court in Wilt v. Buracker,115 agreed with Daubert's con-
378 S.E.2d 282 (W. Va. 1989); W. Va. Dep't of Highways v. Thompson, 375 S.E.2d 585 (W.
Va. 1988) (per curiam); State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Hailer, 363
S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1987); Ventura v. Winegardner, 357 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1987); Rozas v.
Rozas, 342 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1986).
For opinions recognizing Clawsonr/Frye after the adoption of Rule 702, but before the
Woodall decision, see Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Armstrong,
369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Wal-
lace, 337 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1985) (per curiam); State v. Wyant, 328 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va.
1985) (per curiam).
113 Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 256.
114 There appears to have been only one case applying the Woodall formula. See State v.
Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1992). See also State v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 874-75
n.4 (W. Va. 1988).
For opinions discussing expert testimony under Rule 702 after Woodall, but not mention-
ing WoodalllClawson/Frye, see Liston v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. ex rel. W. Va. Univ., 438
S.E.2d 590 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Koon, 440 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1993) (per curiam); State v.
Triplett, 421 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1992); Dobson v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 422 S.E.2d 494
(W. Va. 1992); State v. Stewart, 419 S.E.2d 683 (W. Va. 1992) (per curiam); Arnoldt v. Ash-
land Oil, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 1991); Shaver v. Memel, 412 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1991)
(per curiam); Cargill v. Balloon Works, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 642 (W. Va. 1991) (per curiam); Gil-
man v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1990); Jones v. Games, 395 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1990)
(per curiam); State v. Dietz, 390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990); Bd. of Educ. of McDowell County
v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1990).
115 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).
2002]
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clusion.
Wilt involved a lawsuit filed by two plaintiffs after they sustained per-
manent injuries in an automobile accident.1" 6 The defendant in the case was the
estate of the decedent who caused the accident." 17 A jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.' 18 At the outset of the opinion Justice
Miller noted that "[tihe primary reason [the Court] accepted this appeal was to
determine whether the testimony of an economist calculating a monetary
amount of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, often called hedonic dam-
ages, is admissible evidence."
'1 19
Wilt reviewed some of the West Virginia Supreme Court's prior deci-
sions and noted that the Court had engrafted the Frye standard into Rule 702.120
Wilt then provided some discussion of Daubert and Daubert's rejection of in-
corporating the Frye standard into Federal Rule 702.121 After reviewing Dau-
bert, Justice Miller stated "that Daubert's analysis of Federal Rule 702 should
be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence."'122 Wilt then created the following
principle of law in syllabus point 2 of the opinion:
In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule
702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court's ini-
tial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is based on an
assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology.
Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact at issue. Fur-
ther assessment should then be made in regard to the expert tes-
timony's reliability by considering its underlying scientific
methodology and reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a)
whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have
been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected
to peer review and publication; (c) whether the scientific the-
ory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether
the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific
community. 123
Justice Miller was careful to point out in Wilt that the new standard of
116 Id. at 199.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 200.
120 Id. at 200-01.
121 Id. at 201-03.
122 Id. at 203.
123 Id at 19R
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admissibility of expert testimony sought to ensure the "reliability" of expert
scientific evidence.124 This restriction was imposed because, at that time, Dau-
bert was being interpreted in such a manner.
B. Gentry Expands Wilt
Wilt provided a basic foundation for addressing the admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony. However, in Gentry v. Mangum,'25 Justice Cleckley
provided practical guidance for using Wilt. 1
26
Gentry clearly stated that "Daubert/Wilt mandates that when scientific
evidence is proffered, the circuit court make a preliminary assessment 'at the
outset pursuant to Rule 104(a) of whether the reasoning or methodology under-
lying the testimony is scientifically valid.' ' 127 Justice Cleckley then set out the
124 In syllabus point I of Wilt, Justice Miller provided an exception to applying the test
formulated in the opinion:
Under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, there is a category of expert
testimony based on scientific methodology that is so longstanding and generally rec-
ognized that it may be judicially noticed and, a trial court need not ascertain the basis
for its reliability.
Id. at 198.
125 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995). Gentry was brought as an appeal by the plaintiffs from a
summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendants. One of the issues presented on appeal
involved the trial court's exclusion of evidence by plaintiffs' expert. The Supreme Court ulti-
mately reversed the trial court's decision. Id. at 175.
126 Justice Cleckley did not apply the Wilt/Daubert standard for scientific testimony to the
facts in Gentry because the expert testimony did not involve scientific evidence.
127 Id. at 180. Justice Cleckley also pointed out that "Rule 103(c) of the Rules of Evidence
permits and encourages pretrial motions in limine as the appropriate procedure for determining
the admissibility of time consuming and difficult evidentiary issues." Id. This means that trial
courts do not have to hold time-consuming evidentiary hearings when challenged scientific
expert testimony is sought to be introduced. As a practical matter, in most instances, parties can
simply provide the court with in limine motions and responses that reflect deposition testimony
and relevant exhibits. This allows trial courts to decide the admissibility issue quickly and
without lengthy evidentiary testimony. Obviously, there are exceptions that require evidentiary
hearings, but such hearings should be the exception and not the rule. One of the motivations
behind the adoption of Rule 702 was to avoid the cumbersome and lengthy Frye admissibility
hearings. The Wilt/Gentry analysis does not reinstate the Frye type hearings.
The fact that a Daubert/Kumho hearing may not be required in many instances has been
recognized by commentators and courts. One commentator has said the following:
[T]he recently published second edition of the Federal Judicial Center's
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes the wide latitude given to
the courts in determining the necessity of holding a hearing, with the man-
ual explaining that hearings are not always appropriate and instead are re-
served for complex mass tort cases.
Certainly, a trial court need not hold a full pretrial hearing in every case,
and, indeed, the trial judge in Kumho did not. However, in complex civil
27
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following guidelines:
Under Daubert/Wilt, the circuit court conducts an inquiry into
the validity of the underlying science, looking at the soundness
of the principles or theories and the reliability of the process or
method as applied in the case. The problem is not to decide
whether the proffered evidence is right, but whether the science
is valid enough to be reliable. When scientific evidence is prof-
fered, the circuit court in its "gatekeeper" role must engage in a
two-part analysis in regard to the expert testimony. First, the
litigation that has the potential to affect numerous persons, the trial court
may conclude that extensive evidentiary hearings are the most efficacious
way for the court to inform itself about the factors it will have to take into
account in ruling on admissibility.
Ellen Relkin, To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings Appropriate?, SF78
ALI-ABA 371, 376 (2001) (quoting MARGARET BERGER, THE SUPREME COURT'S TRILOGY ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, IN REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 29
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed., 2000).
Another commentator has observed, "[b]ut Daubert and Kumho Tire do not call
for pretrial 'testimonial hearings' in 'any case involving disputed expert testimony.'
Under these cases ... a trial court need not conduct a pretrial hearing just because a
party demands one." D.H. Kaye, Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist,
Hummert, and Kumho Tire, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 41, 59-60 n.95 (2001).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue squarely and concluded,
The Supreme Court's ... cases Daubert ... and Kumho Tire provide[] the
backdrop for analysis of the issue presented here: whether a separate, pre-
trial hearing, outside the presence of the jury, is required before expert tes-
timony may be admitted at trial. In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis
on the broad discretion granted to trial courts in assessing the relevance and
reliability of expert testimony, and in the absence of any authority mandat-
ing such a hearing, we conclude that trial courts are not compelled to con-
duct pretrial hearings in order to discharge the gatekeeping function.
United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly commented on the issue in the con-
text of admitting fingerprint evidence:
The issue of the reliability of fingerprint evidence after Daubert appears to be
one of first impression in this circuit, and few other courts have addressed
this question. Those discussing the issue have not excluded fingerprint evi-
dence; instead, they have declined to conduct a pretrial Daubert hearing on
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, see [sic] United States v. Marti-
nez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp.2d 17 (D.P.R. 2001) (relying on the district court's
order in this case); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp.2d 79, 82-83 (D.D.C.
2000), or have issued brief opinions asserting that the reliability of finger-
print comparisons cannot be questioned, see [sic] United States v. Sherwood,
98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213
(E.D. La. May 14, 2001).
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
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circuit court must determine whether the expert's testimony re-
flects "scientific knowledge," whether the findings are derived
by "scientific method," and whether the work product amounts
to "good science." Second, the circuit court must ensure that the
scientific testimony is "relevant to the task at hand.' 28
C. The Current Status of Admitting Expert Testimony in West Virginia
Justice Miller correctly followed Daubert in the Wilt opinion, insofar as
the decision abandoned Frye as part of Rule 702. Under Wilt, trial courts are
required to assess scientific expert testimony for relevancy and reliability.
29
Wilt and Gentry have provided excellent tools to help trial judges make an in-
formed decision on reliability and relevancy when confronted with scientific
expert testimony. However, because West Virginia has thus far declined to
adopt Kumho, no such guidance exists for trial courts when they confront non-
scientific expert testimony. Unless and until the Wilt/Gentry analysis is extended
to follow Kumho, the admission of non-scientific expert testimony in West Vir-
ginia will be based upon Rule 702, without application of Wilt/Gentry. In other
words, determinations as to the admissibility of non-scientific expert testimony
will focus primarily on the relevancy of the evidence, without the requirement
of a reliability analysis. 130 This point was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in
Watson v. Inco Alloys International, Inc. 3 1 Thus, the Watson opinion necessi-
tates some discussion.
128 Gentry, 466 S.E.2d at 182.
129 Justice Cleckley stated in syllabus point 3 of Gentry that "[t]he first and universal re-
quirement for the admissibility of scientific evidence is that the evidence must be both 'reli-
able' and 'relevant."' Id. at 174. For an in depth discussion on the issue of reliability under
Wilt/Gentry see Jones v. Patterson Contracting, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 915, 923 (W. Va. 1999)
(Davis, J., concurring and dissenting).
130 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 n.12 (W. Va. 1993) (recognizing that a pure Rule
702 analysis "is concerned primarily with the relevancy of expert testimony" (quoting Gilman
v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200, 202 (W. Va. 1990))).
131 545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001). The Watson decision, which was written by the author of
this article, acknowledged the following:
To date, this Court has declined to adopt the current federal practice, as ex-
pressed in Kumho, of applying the Daubert/Wilt gatekeeper function to ex-
pert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge. At this
time, the majority declines to expressly address whether we will adopt the
new federal procedure regarding expert testimony. However, the author of
this opinion, separate from the majority, does not believe that Kumho would
be a death knell to the admission of non-scientific expert testimony. Indeed,
Kumho has been approved by a majority of state courts who have taken it
under consideration.
Id. at 301-02 n. 11. Accord Jones v. Patterson Contracting, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 915, 923 (1999)
(Davis, J., concurring and dissenting).
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In Watson, which was on appeal from an order granting summary judg-
ment to the defendant, the plaintiffs decedent had been crushed to death in an
accident involving a stand-up lifttruck that backed off the side of a tractor
trailer. 132 The plaintiff sought to admit the expert testimony of a licensed profes-
sional engineer who opined that the lifttruck had been defectively designed in
that it was not equipped with side doors and did not provide appropriate warn-
ings of what an operator should do in case of a fall. 133 The defendant filed a mo-
tion in limine to have the engineer's testimony excluded. 34 The circuit court
concluded that the proposed expert testimony was scientific. 135 It then applied
Wilt/Gentry and determined, based upon a restrictive application of those cases,
that the evidence would be excluded. 136 In this regard, the circuit court explained
that it
[did] not find any basis to show that any test was performed to
show that the plaintiff exited the fork in the manner claimed by
witness Sevart. Furthermore, the court [did] not find any testi-
mony to show that any tests whatsoever were performed to al-
low this court to determine whether witness Sevart's opinions
reflect the use of the scientific method at all. Therefore, any
opinion on side doors and causative effect would have no scien-
tific basis and would constitute witness Sevart's mere personal
opinion. Therefore, this court must exclude witness Sevart's tes-
timony regarding design defects.
37
The West Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court's ap-
plication of Wilt/Gentry to the testimony by the engineer. Instead, the Court
applied a pure Rule 702 analysis, focusing primarily on the relevance of the
testimony, to conclude that the testimony should have been admitted. In so do-
ing, the opinion set out the following principle of law in syllabus point 3:
Unless an engineer's opinion is derived from the methods and
procedures of science, his or her testimony is generally consid-
ered technical in nature, and not scientific. Therefore, a court
considering the admissibility of such evidence should not apply
the gatekeeper analysis set forth by this Court in Wilt/Gentry 38
132 Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 297.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
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The decision in Watson conveys a reluctance by the Court to unify the
law of admissibility of expert testimony in West Virginia.'3 9 That is to say, by
specifically rejecting the Wilt/Gentry analysis in Watson, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court has effectively refused to adopt the Kumho analysis, notwithstand-
ing its hesitance to do so expressly. 140 Such unity in the law, however, would not
realistically present any new barrier to the admissibility of expert testimony that
is based on technical or other specialized knowledge.
For example, assuming arguendo that the West Virginia Supreme Court
had applied and adopted the Kumho standard in Watson, the outcome of that
case would likely have been the same. As Daubert, Wilt, Gentry, and Kumho all
convey, the proper analysis for determining the admissibility of expert testi-
mony is flexible. 14 There is no established set of factors that will apply in every
instance. 42 The circuit court in Watson applied a restrictive interpretation of
Daubert and excluded the testimony due to the absence of scientific testing and
the expert's failure to utilize the "scientific method." A proper application of
Wilt/Gentry, in accordance with the Kumho decision, would have resulted in a
customized set of factors, tailored in accordance with standards applicable to the
expert's area of expertise, to test the reliability of the proposed testimony. Had
the circuit court properly utilized this flexible application of Wilt/Gentry, the
expert's testimony may very likely have been found reliable and admissible.
It is a restrictive interpretation of Kumho that seems to be causing con-
fusion. 143 However, more courts are acknowledging the flexible and liberal
139 See W. Va. Div. of Highways v. Butler, 516 S.E.2d 769, 774-75 n.4 (W. Va. 1999) ("We
decline to adopt the Kumho analysis in this case.").
140 See supra note 130.
141 Moreover, the relevance and reliability analysis applies only to expert testimony that is
not subject to judicial notice. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n. 11
(1993) ("Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those
that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly estab-
lished as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics,
properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201."); Watson, 545
S.E.2d at 301-02 n. 11 ("Kumho, as an extension of Daubert, applies only to expert testimony
that is not subject to judicial notice." (citations omitted)); Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171,
181 (W. Va. 1995) ("Actually, most scientific validity issues will be resolved under judicial
notice pursuant to Rule 201. Indeed, most of the cases in which expert testimony is offered
involve only qualified experts disagreeing about the interpretation of data that was obtained
through standard methodologies. DaubertAWilt is unlikely to impact upon those cases. There-
fore, circuit courts are right to admit or exclude evidence without 'reinventing the wheel' every
time by requiring parties to put on full proof of the validity or invalidity of scientific principles.
Where judicial notice is appropriate, the circuit court should use it." (footnote omitted)); Syl.
Pt. 1, Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 198 (W. Va. 1993) ("Under Rule 702 of the West Vir-
ginia Rules of Evidence, there is a category of expert testimony based on scientific methodol-
ogy that is so longstanding and generally recognized that it may be judicially noticed and, a
trial court need not ascertain the basis for its reliability.").
142 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
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thrust of Kumho. In the case of Rudd v. General Motors, 144 the United States
district court, after acknowledging that engineering is not scientific, stated that,
while "Kumho affirmed the potential applicability of the Daubert factors to tes-
timony that is technical-, engineering-, or experienced-based, the Kumho Court
also made it clear that ... the Daubert-type analysis should not be used to disfa-
vor expert testimony grounded in experience or engineering practice rather than
in pure scientific theory."'
145
VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it is hoped that this article will go a long way in
dispelling the fears surrounding Daubert/Kumho and their application to non-
scientific expert testimony. At this juncture, the expert testimony jurisprudence
of West Virginia is at a cross-road. A majority of states addressing the issue
have embraced Daubert/Kumho, while a minority of states have rejected Dau-
bertlKumho and retained Frye.146 West Virginia has specifically rejected Frye,
accepted Daubert, and thus far refused to adopt and/or expressly reject Kumho.
To adopt Kumho would not significantly alter the landscape of admissible non-
scientific expert testimony in West Virginia. Rather, it would simply provide
trial courts with a consistent framework from which to make their admissibility
determinations. Further consideration as to the weight of an expert's testimony
would remain with the jury. As Justice Cleckley so eloquently stated in Gentry,
"'[c]onventional devices,' like vigorous cross-examination, careful instructions
on the burden of proof, and rebuttal evidence, may be more appropriate instead
of the 'wholesale exclusion' of expert testimony under Rule 702." 147
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1336.
146 See supra notes 35, 84.
147 Gentry, 466 S.E.2d at 184-85 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
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